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TRANSACTION COSTS AND PATENT REFORM
Paul J. Healdt
Abstract
This article considers current proposals for patent law reform in
light of a simple theory about intellectual property law: In a world
without transactions costs, the assignment of property rights is not
necessary to stimulate the optimal production of creative goods.
Because potential users of inventions could contract for their
creation, a compelling justification for granting property rights in
these intangibles is the reduction of real-world transaction and
information costs that hinder, or make impossible, contract formation
between users and creators. Proposals for patent law reform,
therefore, should be evaluated by whether a change in legal rights, or
in the regulatory process increases or lowers these costs.
t Paul J. Heald, Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Many thanks to Bret Frischman,
Shubha Ghosh, Clarisa Long, John Turner, and participants at the Santa Clara Patent Law
Symposium for their comments.
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In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase examined the
simple problem of the person (or firm) that causes harm to its
neighbor in the course of pursuing some legitimate business end, like
grazing livestock, hauling goods on a railroad, or operating a factory.1
Contrary to the accepted wisdom of the time, he concluded that in a
world where the parties could costlessly enter into enforceable
contracts with each other, the choice between imposing liability for
causing damage or adopting a rule of no liability would have no effect
on net social welfare.2 Conversely, he found that the choice of a
liability rule or non-liability rule could have significant welfare
effects in our real world of high transaction costs. 3 In a previous
paper, a colleague and I used Coase's insight to argue that a farmer
harmed by the accidental drift of patented pollen onto his or her
property should not be liable for patent infringement, while a farmer
who takes advantage of this pollen drift should be liable.4 In the
course of that argument, it became clear that enforcing patent rights is
only necessary because of high transaction costs between parties that
need inventions and parties with the capacity to invent them.5 This is
the jumping off point for the following discussion of patent reform,
but an example is necessary first.
Consider Farmer A, who plants 10 acres with herbicide-resistant
patented canola seed. After expending $100 on operating costs (seed,
pesticides, and herbicides), he will harvest 100 bushels, which he can
sell for $2 per bushel, earning him a $100 profit. His operating costs
include a $20 royalty payment to Patentee, the inventor of the
herbicide-resistant seed, who developed the seed after expending $35
on research and development. His neighbor, Farmer B, plants 10 acres
with a cheaper and less productive unpatented seed. After expending
$90 for seed, pesticides, and herbicides, he will harvest 85 bushels of
canola, which he can sell for $2 bushel, earning an $80 profit. During
the growing season, pollen from the Farmer A's patented canola
fertilizes Farmer B's canola. After the harvest, Farmer B saves
enough hybrid seed to plant the following year. The next year, after
expending only $80 for pesticide and herbicides, Farmer B harvests
100 bushels that he can sell for $2 per bushel. Farmer B makes $120
1. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-2 (1960).
2. See id. at 2-15.
3. Id. at 15-19.
4. Paul J. Heald & James C. Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically
ModifiedAge, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 87, 108 (2006).
5. See id. at 103-07.
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in profit, while Farmer A makes the same $100 profit that he made
the previous year. If Farmer B is not liable for patent infringement to
the inventor of the herbicide resistant seed, then the joint value of the
production of Farmer A, Farmer B, and the Patentee is $205, as
illustrated below:
Scenario 1.0- No Liability (High Transaction Costs)
Farmer A Farmer B
10 Acres/100 Bushels 10 Acres/100 Bushels
($2/bushel x 100) - ($2/bushel x 100) -
$100 C.O.P. = $100 $80 C.O.P. = $120
Patentee/Inventor
1 Royalty Payment of $20 - $35 R & D Costs = (-$15)
Joint Production = $205
In the scenario below, we see that imposing $20 in damages for
patent infringement will not immediately change the value of the joint
production of the three parties.
Scenario 1.1 - Liability (High Transaction Costs)
Farmer A Farmer B
10 Acres/100 Bushels 10 Acres/100 Bushels
($2/bushel x 100) - $100 ($2/bushel x 100) - $80
C.O.P. = $100 C.O.P. - $20 damages = $100
Patentee/Inventor
1 Royalty Payment of $20 + 1 Damage Award of $20 -
$35 R & D Costs = $5
Joint Production = $205
If we contemplate only the value of joint production, there seems
little reason to require a transfer payment from Farmer B to the
Patentee. If joint production is not increased, a deadweight loss would
2007]
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seem to be created by requiring a transfer from Farmer B to the
Patentee/Inventor.
Even though at first glance the imposition of liability for
infringement would not increase the net value of the joint production,
a plausible argument can be made that unless the patentee can recover
its research and development costs by collecting royalties for the use
of its invention, it will have inadequate incentives to invent the
herbicide resistant seed. This is the sort of true technological
externality that can be used to justify a liability rule under Coasean
analysis. 6 The hypothetical is designed to illustrate how the
externality can occur. If the seed company knows that it cannot
collect the second royalty, its research and development costs ($35)
will exceed its expected return ($20 from Farmer A and it will not
invent the seed. Without the herbicide resistant seed, both farmers
will be forced to use the non-patented seed planted by Farmer B
initially, and the patentee will save the $35 expended on research and
development. The value of joint production will fall to $195 without
the availability of the patented seed, as illustrated below:
Scenario 1.2 - New Seed Never Invented (High Transaction Costs)
Farmer A Farmer B
10 Acres/85 Bushels 10 Acres/85 Bushels
($2/bushel x 85) - $90 C.O.P. ($2/bushel x 85) - $90 C.O.P.
-$80 = $80
Patentee/Inventor
0 Royalty Payments of $20 + $35 R & D Costs Saved = $35
Joint Production = $195
A comparison of scenarios 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 seems to make a
strong case for liability. Forcing the transfer payment will stimulate
production of the herbicide resistant seed, which will in turn increase
the joint value of production by $20, to $205. It appears that net social
welfare is increased.7
6. See id. at 105-07 & n.66.
7. Scenario 1.2 assumes that the patentee will not do anything socially useful with the
$35 R & D expenditure that it has saved. This may be a highly unrealistic assumption. If those
savings can be invested to produce value that exceeds the $20 canola production gain, then
TRANSACTION COSTS AND PATENT REFORM 451
From the standpoint of net social welfare, however, liability is
only necessary when the total cost of transacting between the farmers
and the inventor is high. Why? If transaction costs are low, then the
parties ,will contract for the efficient solution. Rational farmers will be
willing to pay up to $20 each to the inventor in return for the creation
of the patented seed, because a farmer paying $19 for the new seed
(thereby earning a gross profit of $81) is still $1 better off than it
would be using the old seed. The inventor, on the other hand, will
invent the seed if each farmer is willing to pay more than $17.50
each, given its R&D costs are $35. If a deal can be struck between the
two farmers and the inventor, then net social welfare will be
maximized without the need for a liability rule, or indeed any
property right assigned in the invention. We can predict that if
transaction costs are less than $5 (the difference between the lowest
acceptable price to the inventor, $35, and the highest combined
acceptable price to the farmers, $40), then the transaction will occur
in the absence, of any liability -rule or any property right in the
invention. All that is needed is system of enforceable contracts.
In a recent paper, Professor Khan provides a nice historical
example of the irrelevance of property rights when transaction costs
are low.8 Until 1891, the United States did not recognize copyrights in
foreign books, so valuable books by famous 19th Century English
authors were effectively in the public domain from the moment of
their publication. 9 Manual type-setting at the time was highly labor
intensive and expensive, and Khan describes "costly races by
American publishers to be the first to print the newest English fiction"
that resulted in "ruinous competition. . . likely to drive prices down to
marginal cost, in which case the high'initial investments would not be
society should prefer that the herbicide-resistant seed not be invented. This question of marginal
utility pinpoints one reason why economists are so hesitant to argue that patent law is efficient;
it is extremely difficult to account for the alternative uses to which inventive resources might be
put. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 37 (3d ed. 1986) (noting that
"[t]he costs of the patent system include.., inducing potentially excessive investment in
inventing"); Janusz A. Ordover, Economic Foundations and Considerations in Protecting
Industrial and Intellectual Property, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 503, 507 (1984) (explaining that patent
law "may lead to excessive investment in the creation of intellectual and industrial property").
See also Paul J. Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 143, 157 n.69 (1991) ("In
other words, a work should be [patentable] only if necessary to encourage the work, and the
work is more socially useful than whatever else the [inventor] would chose to do, for example,
child rearing or brickmasonry.").
8. See B. Zorina Khan, Does Copyright Piracy Pay? The Effects of U.S. International
Copyright Laws on the Market for Books, 1790-1920, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10271 (2004), http://www.nber.org/papers/w 10271.
9. See id. at 9.
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recovered."' Without a system of property rights, works by Dickens,
Browning, and Tennyson, threatened to go under-exploited due to the
difficulty in recouping high type-setting costs." Thankfully for
American readers, the number of potentially competing publishers
was not so unwieldy that a contractual accommodation could not be
reached between them. Indeed, publishers solved the problem through
collusion, agreeing among themselves that certain publishing houses
would have the exclusive rights to certain works.' 2 Transaction costs
were low enough that a contractual solution could solve the problem
of the under provision of valuable goods. 13
Normally, we assume that enforceable property rights are
necessary to ensure the creation of public goods like inventions and
books, but this is only true if the cost of transacting is high. If
transaction costs are low enough, as was likely between 1 9th Century
American printers,1 4 then public goods will be provided even in the
absence of enforceable property rights. A system of enforceable
contracts will be enough. In the context of our seed scenarios, we
have already seen that if transaction costs are low enough, then the
new seed will be developed and social welfare optimized through
contract, without the need for a patent system.
For this reason, the patent system is probably not needed to
stimulate inventions that only benefit the firm that invents them. If
Ford management decides that its line of SUVs needs to get better gas
mileage, then it can at relatively little cost instruct its R&D unit to
work on the problem. The eventual result of the intra-firm
communication might be a new mechanism that raises the mileage
obtained by Ford SUVs by ten percent. If only Ford benefits from this
invention (because other firms cannot take advantage of the
technology in their own different engine designs) then Ford will
invent it whether or not it can receive a patent. The allocation of
property rights in this context is unnecessary.
Typically, costs are not so low. Imagine that Ford's invention is
equally usable by others in the automotive field. In a world without
patent law, Ford would have to contract with competitors to prevent
losses due to free riding it before incurred the cost of invention. If
10. Id. at 21.
11. See id. ("If all firms produced rival editions, competition was likely to drive prices
down to marginal cost, in which case the high initial fixed investments would not be
recovered.").
12. Id. at 24.
13. See id. at 14-15.
14. See id. at 24.
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competitors could easily take advantage of the invention, then Ford
will have to obtain promises from its competitors to pay a royalty for
using the invention. Why? If Ford's competitors can freely use the
invention to increase their mileage, then Ford obtains no comparative
advantage over them and would no longer have an incentive to create
the gas-saving device in the first place. 15 Without patent law, a series
of contracts would be Ford's only source of protection.
To borrow from Coase's own list of transaction costs, Ford
would have to "discover who it is that [it] wishes to deal with, to
inform people that [it] wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to
undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on., 16 Most importantly, Ford will
have to overcome Arrow's information paradox, 17 where in a world
without patent law, it must try to communicate the nature and value of
its invention to its competitors without revealing it, because any
revelation could be misappropriated. In addition, Ford would want to
know enough about its competitors' operations in order to
approximate its value to them.
As used in this paper, the term transaction costs encompasses all
the costs of using a contractual solution to facilitate creation
including: Information costs (identifying potential users of the
invention; signaling the inventive capacity of the inventor; and
valuing the invention), Negotiation Costs (pricing the invention; legal
costs and opportunity costs; and obtaining financing), and
Enforcement Costs (monitoring the parties to the contract; and
preventing intra-firm opportunism). If these costs are too high in the
aggregate, then the series of contracts necessary to insure invention in
a world without patent law would not be entered into. The problem of
innovation, therefore, is primarily a problem of reducing these costs.
15. Unless the industry-wide mileage gains resulted in an increase in overall auto sales so
that Ford's share of the increase was greater than the cost of invention.
16. Coase, supra note 1, at 15.
17. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 280 & n.174 (1998)
[T]here is a significant obstacle-known as "Arrow's Information Paradox" - to
bargaining over secret information. A trade secret owner generally is reluctant to
reveal the secret unless the potential licensee first promises not to use it in the
event a license is not negotiated. The licensee, on the other hand, is not likely to
make such a promise without first learning the secret.
(footnote omitted) (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 614-16 (1962)).
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The government sometimes tries to solve this problem by
making research grants. 18 If the U.S. Department of Transportation
pays Ford a sufficient sum to create a gas-saving device and dedicate
it to the public domain, virtually all of the costs identified above
disappear (at least from Ford's perspective). More pervasively, the
government tries to solve the transaction costs problem by granting
property rights to inventors. 19 Several scholars have recently detailed
how the patent system lowers transactions costs and thereby
stimulates invention. 20 More broadly, they explain how the granting
of a limited property right in an invention makes transactions, and
therefore invention, more likely to occur.21
Perhaps those who recognized that patents reduce negotiation
costs in several ways have made the most important contribution.22
Consider the agricultural firm with inventive capacity to engineer a
valuable new seed and a group of farmers who would be willing to
purchase the new seed were it invented. The firm has two significant
problems in convincing the farmers to promise to pay for the future
seed and thereby fund the research. First, it will have difficulty
accurately describing the precise qualities and likely benefits of the
new seed if it has not yet been invented. Second, even if it has already
been invented (perhaps adventitiously in the course of another
project), it may fear misappropriation by the farmers who will
demand to examine it and understand the nature of the improvement
before they make any promises of compensation. Although this is
probably less a problem with seeds than with a new machine, where
examination is more likely to reveal the nature of the improvement,
the point is still clear-no one wants to buy a pig in a poke. If the
18. One important source of grants is the National Institutes for Health. National
Institutes of Health: Grants and Funding Opportunities, http://grantsl.nih.gov/grants/index.cfm
(last visited March 19, 2007).
19. See 35 U.S.C. § § 101-103 (2001) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
20. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Cost of Commercial
Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1570, 1590-91 (1995); Clarisa Long, Information
Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REv. 465, 469 (2004); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals,
69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 625-28 (2002) [hereinafter Long, Patent Signals]; Nancy T. Gallini &
Ralph A. Winter, Licensing in the Theory ofInnovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 237, 238 (1985).
21. See supra note 20.
22. See, e.g., James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Expropriation and Inventions:
Appropriable Rents in the Absence of Property Rights, I AM. ECON. REV. 190, 191-92 (1994)
(analyzing how patents help solve Arrow's information paradox, enabling independent inventors
to negotiate with firms); see also, e.g., Merges, supra note 20, at 1590 (1995) (discussing how
intellectual property rights lower transaction costs).
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firm is granted an enforceable property right in the new seed, then it
can reveal it fully and with more confidence. Moreover, because a
patent will make a successful negotiation more likely, the firm may be
more willing to take the risk of creating the seed before approaching
the farmers.
The written description and claim requirements 23 of patent law
further reduce the cost of negotiation by identifying as clearly as
possible the object of the negotiation. Words imperfectly capture the
precise nature of an improvement, but written claims provide an
initial and uniform specification of the rights and responsibilities of
each party to the contract for invention.24 Finally, circumstances may
arise when neither the agricultural firm, nor the farmers have adequate
capital to finance the invention. In this case, patent law reduces the
cost of capital by lowering negotiation costs with the financier by
creating a legal object-the patent-that can be taken as collateral.2 5
And, as Long has pointed out, patenting signals the strength of a
debtor firm's human capital and innovative capacity to venture
capitalists.
26
This leads to the second point of how patent law helps solve
certain information problems. In addition to the signals patents send
to venture capitalists and others who analyze markets, they also help
identify sources of inventive capacity to potential users. It does not
take much time on the United States Patent Office web site (think of it
as an electronic bulletin board) to determine that Monsanto has
tremendous inventive capacity in the market for new seeds.27 The
information provided by the publication of all patents also indirectly
helps in the difficult task of valuation and pricing by providing a
central clearinghouse of information on innovation.
28
The property right created by the patent system reduces
transaction costs in other, subtler, ways. Image how inventors would
behave if only trade secrecy were available to protect research and
development. Secrets are extremely leaky, and firms relying on trade
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112(2000).
24. See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,
496 (2005).
25. Id. at 497-99.
26. See Long, Patent Signals, supra note 20, at 646-48.
27. See United States Patent and Trademark Office,
http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html (enter "Monsanto" in Term I text box;
then click "Search") (last visited March 27, 2007).
28. See F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and
the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1227 (2003).
2007]
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secrecy must be constantly vigilant against misappropriation.
Precautions must be taken to fence off secrets in a physical manner,
by employing locks, safes, partitions, and blackened windows, but
also in a figurative sense, through the use of restrictive employment
covenants and a careful division of labor.3° When the end product of
invention is embodied in a patent, the need for precautions is greatly
reduced. 31 A departing employee can surreptitiously take a secret with
him to be used by a future employer (who cannot consult a title
registry to check the provenance of the secret). A patented invention
is not so easily passed off as the former employee's.
The cost of fencing off secrets from employees is perhaps not
intuitively conceived as a cost of enforcement. The first model
presented above, consisting solely of the agricultural engineering firm
and the two farmers, was kept deliberately simple to illustrate how the
Coase Theorem applies to the market for creative goods. In reality,
the picture is substantially more complex. Inventive firms are unlikely
to be atomistic. Innovation usually requires the cooperation and
coordination of a creative team consisting of researchers and
managers within the firm and sources of capital and creative input
from outside the firm. 32 In fact, when Blair and Stout define team
production,33 they even include political communities that provide
raw materials, infrastructure, education resources, and tax subsidies in
the production equation. More complexity is added when one
considers that innovation usually involves more consumers than just
two farmers. Frequently, thousands of users are in the market for a
particular innovation. One might call the vast web of relationships
between the creative team and diffuse users, "the inventive contract."
Preventing misappropriation, intra or inter-firm, is part of the cost of
enforcing the inventive contract.
The hypothetical contract between a vast team with a collective
inventive capacity and the body of potential users is an interdependent
series of formal and informal agreements. Monitoring and
coordinating the many subsidiary agreements is another part of the
enforcement costs identified above. Patents lower these costs by
assigning the rights in the invention to a single, clearly identifiable
29. See Heald, supra note 24 at 487-88.
30. Id. at 488.
31. Patent counts can also be used to reduce shirking by allowing a more predictable ex
ante division of profits from creative activity.
32. See Heald, supra note 24, at 487-89.
33. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (2001).
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owner who has the proper incentives to manage team production and
market the innovation to potential users.34 If the only way to defeat
free riders and deter misappropriation were through secrecy, the task
of monitoring, coordination, and marketing would become vastly
more expensive. It's difficult to imagine, for example, a complex
cooperative creativity entity like the MP-3 patent pool operating on
the basis of trade secrecy.35 Finally, because it acts as an affirmative
asset partition, patents reduce the fear of interference from creditors
and heirs of those with claims to the fruits of the inventive process.
This asset partition facilitates long term planning by the creative
firm.
36
In a world with sufficiently low transaction costs, those who
needed an invention would simply contract with those possessing
inventive capacity. Frequently, the cost of obtaining adequate
information, the cost of negotiating agreements, and the cost of
enforcing them is too high for a unitary "contract for invention" to
materialize. Patent law reduces these costs through the creation of a
property right, not by offering the promise of monopoly profits for
patentees.37 The patent system, therefore, is most accurately viewed as
a mechanism by which this transaction costs problem is addressed.
This insight has concrete implications for patent law reform:
Any changes to the patent system should lower information,
negotiation, or enforcement costs. One measure of how well patent
law can do this job is seen in the effect that the Bayh-Dole Act38 had
on technology transfer by universities. Before 1980, universities
receiving federal funds were not allowed to patent inventions.39
Predictably, universities enthusiastically embraced patenting after the
change in the law, even at a time when they were apparently not
engaging in significantly more research. 40 The authors of a study of
the Bayh-Dole Act concluded that "the increase in university
patenting probably reflects an increased rate of technology transfer to
34. See Heald, supra note 24, at 490-96.
35. See id. at 495-96.
36. See id. at 480-84.
37. See Heald, supra note 24, at 489 ("[T]he role of patents ... is not the traditional role
of creating monopolies by prohibiting the exploitation of informational spillovers. Rather, by
protecting property rights, patents here open the market for trade in technological information.")
(citing Gallini & Winter, supra note 20, at 238).
38. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000).
39. See DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, 797-801 (3d ed.
2004).
40. Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A
Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119, 119-20 (1998).
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the private sector, and this has probably increased the social rate of
return to university research., 41 The availability of patents (as
opposed to the prior regime of trade secrecy) facilitated the
technology transfer agreements, almost certainly because negotiation
and information costs were lowered. If so, then the Bayh-Dole Act is
a prime example of how successful patent reform might be realized.
The Bayh-Dole story shows that the mere recognition of a new
property right lowers transaction costs. The effectiveness of that
property right, however, is sensitive to other factors that might be the
subject of reform. For example, after the creation of the Federal
Circuit, the patent validity rate doubled.42 During the same period, the
rate of patenting followed the same upward curve, at a time when
R&D expenditures were not rising in real terms.43 In other words,
patents became more valuable and more desirable to obtain as they
became more predictably enforceable. A reliable patent, one that is
less vulnerable to judicial nullification, is more likely to reduce the
transaction costs described above. Reform that. enhances
predictability, reliability, and confidence, like the creation of the
Federal Circuit, would seem to be especially desirable.
In general, the transaction costs perspective is friendly to reform
proposals that are likely to make patents more tradable. Consider
Lemley, Lichtman, and Sampat's proposal for a two-tiered patent
system that would allow applicants to pay a higher fee for tighter
patent office scrutiny, resulting in a "gold-plated" patent.44 Such a
patent would be less vulnerable to judicial nullification and therefore
a more certain subject of exchange. In fact, the additional payment
made by the willing patentee would provide valuable information to
markets about the value of the invention. On the other hand, Lemley's
suggestion that courts should play a significant role in policing patent
office errors45 may be misguided. He worries about too many
resources being expended by the patent office to evaluate patents.
Since most patents are never licensed or enforced, he is comfortable
41. Id. at 126.
42. See Donald Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent
Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 151, 154-55 & n.22 (1995) (presenting statistics of the
patent validity rate-the rate at which patents are declared valid in litigation).
43. See James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation 16-
19, MIT Econ. Dept., Working Paper No. 00-01 (2000),
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf
44. Mark Lemley, Douglas Lichtman, & Bhaven Sampat, What to do About Bad
Patents?, 28 REGULATION 12-13 (2005).
45. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REv. 1495,
1531-32 (2001).
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with letting the judicial system play a substantial role in making sure
inventions meet the necessary statutory criteria.46 The history of the
Federal Circuit shows, however, that when the patent validity rate
drops, the patenting rate drops.4 7 Patents become less reliable and less
frequently the object of exchange. In other words, when courts are
actively striking down patents, transaction costs are likely to increase,
thereby hindering the primary purpose of the patent system. One
advantage of the gold-plating proposal is that it encourages owners of
valuable and likely-to-be-litigated patents to self-identify, allowing
the patent office to devote its resources in a more effective manner,
thereby improving the reliability of patents at little additional
administrative cost.
Other reform suggestions can be judged by the same criteria. For
example, an examination system whereby competitors could
challenge patents before they issue might also lower transaction costs.
A patent that survives an ex parte challenge would have the desirable
"gold-plated" quality. It would be less vulnerable to judicial
nullification and therefore more likely to be traded or licensed. In
fact, overall validity rates may rise, given that fewer bad patents
should issue. And, the addition of ex parte challenges could be tied to
a rule requiring that all patent applications be published immediately
upon filing, which would get more information to interested parties
more quickly than the present 18-month rule.48 Any procedure,
however, should be constructed to minimize the possibility that a
competitor could waste resources in a bad faith, anti-competitive
challenge to a patent. If the ex parte procedure makes prosecuting a
patent too expensive, then the patent system will become less usable
and patenting rates may drop.
The Supreme Court has recently initiated reform of a sort by
making it harder for patentees to get injunctions. In MercExchange,
LLC v. Ebay, Inc., the Federal Circuit applied a virtual per se
presumption that patentees are entitled to an injunction following a
finding of infringement.49 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded
46. See id. at 1503-06, 1511.
47. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An
Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. OF
ECON. 101, 104, 118 (2001).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2000) ("[E]ach application for a patent shall be published...
promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date .... ").
49. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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with instructions that the traditional four-part balancing of equities
test be applied.5 °
The decision may make patent law look slightly more like a
liability rule and slightly less like a property rule, and may effect the
transaction costs equation. First, the stronger the penalty for patent
infringement, the more licensing agreements may be stimulated due to
the fear of being sued for infringement. Users would be less likely to
conclude that a patent is not valid and that no license need be entered
into. Therefore, some unnecessary contracts may be entered into,
because the cost of negotiating a license for technology that does not
qualify for protection is wasted. On the other hand, if penalties for
patent infringement were always limited to a reasonable royalty,
fewer licensing agreements would be entered into because the penalty
for infringement would be no greater than the price of the license.
Incentives to negotiate would be diminished, saving the cost of
negotiation, but resulting in fewer voluntary exchanges. Given the
costliness of judicial royalty determinations, truly voluntary changes
are usually preferable.
So, one cost of a stronger property right, consistently enforceable
via injunction, might be the increased licensing of invalid patents, but
a benefit may come from the increased licensing of valid patents to
users who might otherwise free ride. A rule that accounts for the
mental state of the infringer might maximize this cost/benefit
equation. The traditional four-part test endorsed by the Supreme
Court for determining the appropriateness of an injunction5 may,
therefore, be inadequate to capture what is really at issue. The Court
reminded the Federal Circuit to address the following questions
before issuing an injunction:
(1) Did the plaintiff suffer irreparable injury?;
(2) Would remedies at law, like money damages, be inadequate
to redress this injury?;
(3) Does the balance of hardships favor injunctive relief?.; and
(4) Would equitable relief disserve the public interest?52
The primary focus instead should be on the infringer's ex ante
evaluation of whether its activity was infringing or not. If a rational
50. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. at 1837.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1839.
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infringer would have entertained serious doubts as to the patent's
enforceability, then an injunction should be more difficult obtain.
Fewer sterile licensing agreements will be entered into if good faith
users do not have to worry about the punitive aspects5 3 of a permanent
injunction, while users who cannot plausibly claim objective good
faith will be forced by the injunction to enter into an agreement after
trial.
Many patent law rules, of course, seem to have no direct bearing
on the cost of the inventive contract. Instead, they seem designed to
reduce the cost invoking a property right solution to the transactional
problem. As many economists have noted, the granting of exclusive
rights to inventors may result in monopoly costs that effect net public
welfare.54 For this reason, many patent rules attempt to ameliorate
these costs. For example, the requirements of novelty, 55 non-
obviousness,56 usefulness,57 and the limited time term58 all reduce
possible monopoly costs associated with granting a property right in a
public good like an invention. They do this, however, by establishing
rough cut rules of what sort of inventions users would be willing to
contract for and on what terms. Since we cannot imagine potential
users being willing to contract for inventions that are not new or
useful, or that consist of insignificant improvements over the prior art,
or that require eternal licenses, we limit the definition of the property
right accordingly.
In a world where the creative enterprise requires complex
teamwork and users are diffuse, patent law, therefore, serves a dual
purpose. First, it stimulates actual transactions between parties by
lowering information, negotiation, and enforcement costs by creating
property rights in certain sorts of creative activity. Second, when an
actual transaction is unlikely to occur before creation, it defines the
scope of the property right by mimicking the basic terms that
inventors and users would use to describe a contribution worthy of
compensation. The basic property right created by patent law does
53. See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 34, Stanford
Law School, Working Paper No. 324 (2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=923468
(quantifying the premium that successful plaintiffs receive when negotiating a license with an
accused infringer in the shadow of injunctive relief).
54. See e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 37, 258-59.
55. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
57. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) ("such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States").
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much of the work in making the inventive contract a market reality.
Any attempts to fine-tune that system should be keenly aware of the
likely effect of change on that market.
